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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT LUKUS,
Plaintiff,

Case No.

vs.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH,

10029

Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case, which is presented pursuant to a writ of
certiorari, calls for a review by the Supreme Court of the
Industrial Commission's proceedings and Order for the
purpose of determining whether the Industrial Commission
exceeded its power and authority and whether or not the
findings of fact and evidence introduced support the Commission's decision.
DISPOSITION BEFORE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The plaintiff was denied coverage of an alleged industrial accident claim and thereafter made application for a
hearing to settle the industrial accident claim on the 16th
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day of February, 1963. The claim came on for hearing
after a postponement of the original hearing date, and the
Industrial Commission made its Order denying the applicant's claim on August 15, 1963. On or about the 12th day
of September, 1963, the plaintiff filed a petition for rehearing by his attorney, Norman H. Jackson, and the petition for rehearing was formally denied by the Industrial
Commission on the 23rd day of September, 1963. On the
3rd day of December, 1963, a writ of certiorari was filed
for review by this court.
DISPOSITION SOUGHT BY THE DEFENDANT
The defendant Industrial Commission asks that the
Supreme Court affirm the Order (R. 99) of the Industrial
Commission which found that at the time of the injury the
plaintiff was not an employee but was in fact an independent contractor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 24th day of December, 1962, Mr. Ray Townsley
called the plaintiff regarding some cutting and welding on
an oil rig in the Kanab Creek Unit, Utah. On the 26th day
of December the plaintiff, furnishing his own transportation and taking with him his own cutting machine and
tools, arc welder, welding rod, and other supplies (R. 49,
50), arrived at the site at approximately 10 :00 o'clock a.m.
on the said 26th day of December, 1962 (R. 45). Plaintiff
carried his own equipment, tools, and supplies in his own
truck from his home in Fredonia to the site of work, which
takes approximately 20 minutes. The plaintiff's regular
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hourly rate for welding was $4.00, but the plaintiff was
paid $6.00 an hour, pursuant to agreement, to compensate
for equipment, tools, and supplies furnished, together with
transportation (R. 51, 54, 55).
Mr. Townsley of Mountain States Drilling Company
directed the plaintiff as to what work should be done, but
left the plaintiff with full discretion and freedom as to how
to do the cutting and welding of the job shown, but in no
way did Mr. Townsley or any other employee of Mountain
States Drilling Company or Superior Oil Company attempt
to direct or control the cutting and welding which the
plaintiff was doing (R. 46, 51, 52). While the plaintiff
was cutting off a valve, the valve fell onto the plaintiff's
right hand and cut off plaintiff's index finger, which was
sewed back on by a doctor (R. 40, 41, 47). The plaintiff
submitted a bill on his own contractor form showing five
hours of cutting and welding at an hourly charge of $6.00,
for a total payment of $30.00 (R. 80), and submitted this
bill to Superior Oil Company through Mr. Ray Townsley,
who was an employee of Mointain States Drilling Company.
Superior Oil Company made the $30.00 payment (R. 94)
without deducting federal or state withholding taxes, social
security or any other withholding.
Superior Oil Company and Mountain States Drilling
Company denied that the plaintiff was an employee of
either or both of these companies and insist plaintiff was
an independent contractor (R. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 25) . Thereupon
plaintiff submitted an application for a hearing before the
Industrial Commission for a determination of the claim
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for workmen's compensation coverage (R. 9, 10). The
record discloses that there was considerable correspondence
between the plaintiff and the defendant, as well as the
American Insurance Company, Mountain States Drilling
Company and the State Insurance Fund, showing that the
plaintiff was very active in proclaiming his cause (R. 11,
21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29). The Industrial Commission,
pursuant to request, set the matter for hearing on the 6th
day of May, 1963, and sent a copy of the notice of hearing
to all parties concerned, including the plaintiff (R. 30).
By letter of April 29, 1963 from the Industrial Commission,
notice was given to all parties concerned, including the
plaintiff, that the hearing set for May 6, 1963 at 9:00
o'clock a.m., was continued without date, and that the
reason for this continuance was the inability of securing
a witness asked by the State Insurance Fund, who was
Mr. Ray Townsley (R. 33, 34). Thereupon the plaintiff
wrote to the Industrial Commission requesting another
hearing date before the Conunission (R. 35). Notice of
taking a deposition of Mr. Ray Townsley was sent the 4th
day of June, 1963, to all the interested parties, including
the plaintiff (R. 36, 37). The new hearing date was set
by the Industrial Commission, and notice thereof was sent
on the 18th day of June, 1963, to all parties concerned, including the plaintiff, that the new hearing date was the
16th day of July, 1963 (R. 38). The plaintiff sent in a request for a physical examination by the Medical Advisory
Board on the same date of July 16, 1963 (R. 39).
On the date of July 16, the plaintiff did appear before
the Industrial Commission, and the other parties being
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present, a hearing was held (R. 42 through 79), and the
various exhibits 1 through 4 were admitted, including the
deposition of Ray Townsley, also known as Eddie R.
Townsley. The Order of the Commission denying the claim
of the plaintiff was dated August 15, 1963, and sent to the
various parties interested, including the plaintiff (R. 99).
A petition and application for rehearing was filed on behalf
of the plaintiff by Mr. Norman Jackson, attorney at law, on
September 12, 1963. The petition for rehearing was formally denied on September 23, 1963, and a copy of the denial
was sent to the interest parties, including the plaintiff, but
not to his attorney, Mr. Norman Jackson (R. 101, 102).
On September 27, Mr. Norman Jackson sent a letter to the
Industrial Commission, enclosing therewith his brief (R.
103 through 111). There is correspondence between Mr.
Jackson and the Industrial Commission from October 2 to
November 19, 1963, concerning the petition for rehearing
and its denial (R. 112 through 115). The writ of certiorari
was filed December 3, 1963 in the Utah Supreme Court (R.
116).
On February 3, 1964, plaintiff brought a motion before
the Supreme Court to have parties defendant, to wit, Mountain States Drilling Company, Inc., State Insurance Fund,
Superior Oil Company, and Associated Indemnity Company, added as co-parties defendant. The defendant Industrial Commission answered the motion and requested
that the motion to amend and bring in additional parties be
denied, and furthermore, prayed that the writ of certiorari
be dismissed with costs. The Supreme Court denied plaintiff's motion to add parties defendant, and the relief prayed
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for by defendant Industrial Commission as to dismissal of
the writ of certiorari is reserved for final determination
in this rna tter.
All notices and communications between the parties in
the record were by mail as evidenced by Exhibit A of de·
fendant's answer to plaintiff's motion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION SHOULD BE GRANTED AND THE
\VRIT OF CERTIORARI OF PLAINTIFF BE
DISMISSED.
The exclusive remedy for a writ of certiorari is stated
in Section 35-1-83, U. C. A. 1953, as follows:
"Within thirty days after notice that the application for a rehearing is denied, or, if the application is granted within thirty days after notice of
the rendition of the decision on the rehearing, any
party including the commission of finance affected
thereby may apply to the Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari for the purpose of having the lawfulness of the original award or the award on rehearing inquired into and determined." (Emphasis
added.)
This section has had an interesting background prior
to the amendment of this section which theretofore did not
require notice of the denial of the application for rehearing.
The Utah Supreme Court in Woldberg v. Industrial
Commission, 74 Utah 309, 279 Pac. 609, required, and in
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Heledakis v. Industrial Commission, 66 Utah 608, 245 Pac.
334, stated, that it was mandatory that for a writ of certiorari to be considered properly by this court, said writ
had to be filed within thirty days after the denial of the
petition for rehearing.
In Utah Fuel Company v. Industrial Commission, 73

Utah 199, 273 Pac. 306, a writ of certiorari was denied
to the plaintiff on the basis that the writ had not been
filed within thirty days after the denial of a petition for
rehearing, and even though an affidavit did show that the
counsel for plaintiff was not given notice of such denial
and that plaintiff himself was not given notice of the denial, and even though counsel for plaintiff had appeared
at the office of the Industrial Commission within 30 days
after plaintiff's motion for rehearing was denied, to inquire about the decision of the case, and counsel was informed erroneously that no ruling or decision had been
made, and in fact counsel did not receive notice until after
the thirty days had expired, the Utah Supreme Court ruled
that the thirty-day period was a mandatory rule for jurisdiction and that since it had not been complied with, the
Utah Supreme Court could not take jurisdiction, and dismissed the writ. The rule definitely seems to be that, although harsh, the thirty-day period must be complied with
or else jurisdiction is lost.
In Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 4 Utah 2d 185,
290 P. 2d 692, the following statement was made:

"* * * The act provides that a party aggrieved by the action of the Commission may apply
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for a rehearing or seek a review in this court within
times prescribed by law. This is the exclusive means
of securing a review of a determination made on
any given state of facts. * * *" P. 694.
Therefore, since the statute had been complied with
and notice had been given to the plaintiff, which is certified pursuant to Exhibit A attached to the answer of defendant to plaintiff's motion, there is no jurisdiction for
this court and the writ of certiorari should be dismissed.
The Industrial Commission is excused by statute from
following rules of civil procedure in Section 35-1-88, U. C.
A. 1953, as follows:
"The commission shall not be bound by the
usual common law or statutory rules of evidence,
or by any technical or formal rules of procedure,
other than as herein provided; but may make its
investigations in such manner as in its judgment is
best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights
of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of
this title."
Therefore, even though Section 35-1-83, U. C. A. 1953,
requires notice to be given, the notice contemplated is the
notice to the claimant himself, which was given pursuant
to Exhibit A of defendant's answer to plaintiff's motion,
which was heard on February 3, 1964, and no notice need
be given to the attorney as required in Rule 5 (b) (1) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
It should be noted that Rule 5(b) (1) of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
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"Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney * * *." (Emphasis added.)
There is no civil rule of procedure in Utah requiring
notice to be served upon plaintiff or his attorney by the
defendant Industrial Commission, and therefore Rule
6(b) (1) does not apply, and the notice to claimant is
deemed a valid notice, as were all other notices and communications directly between the plaintiff and defendant.
The only requirement of Section 35-1-83, U. C. A. 1953, is
notice to the claimant, plaintiff in this instance, and any
other requirement by this court would in effect be a legislative change of the statute.
POINT II.
THE FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARE BASED UPON
SUFFICIENT COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND
SHOULD NOT BE OVERRULED.
It has been well reasoned by the Supreme Court that

pursuant to Section 35-1-84, U. C. A. 1953, only if all the
evidence is contrary to the findings of fact by the Industrial Commission will said Commission be reversed. There
are numerous cases decided by the Supreme Court indicating that this is the general rule of law.
In Sutton, et al., v. Industrial Commission, 9 Utah 2d
339, 344 P. 2d 538, the Supreme Court held that as long as
there is any credible evidence in the record to sustain the
findings of the Commission, this is sufficient to uphold the
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Commission, and that there is no arbitrariness or capriciousness in its decision.
It should be noted that in this particular case the

plaintiff testified that he was being paid $6.00 an hour for
the work for Superior Oil Company, and that his usual
charge was $4.00 an hour (R. 54, 55), and that the additional takes care of the equipment and supplies (R. 48, 49,
51).
In the case of Christean v. Industrial Commission, 113
Utah 451, 196 P. 2d 502, the court discusses the matter of
employee versus independent contractor, and quotes from
the Restatement of the Law of Agency, Par. 220, page 483,
as found therein as follows :
" ( 1) A servant is a person employed to perform service for another in his affairs and who,
with respect to this physical conduct in the performance of the service, is subject to the other's
control or right to control.
"(2) In determining whether one acting for
another is a servant or an independent contractor,
the following matters of fact, among others, are
considered :
"a. The extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of
the work;
"b. whether or not the employed is engaged in
a distinct occupation or business;
"c. the kind of occupation, with reference to
whether, in the locality, the work is usually done
under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;
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.. d.
pation;

the skill required in the particular occu-

"e. whether the employer or the workman
supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place
of work for the person doing the work;
"f. the length of time for which the person
is employed;
"g. the method of payment, whether by the
time or by the job;
"h. whether or not the work is a part of the
regular business of the employer; and
"i. whether or not the parties believe they are
creating the relationship of master and servant."
(Quoted from 196 P. 2d p. 505.)

In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission of
Utah, 12 U. 2d 223, 364 P. 2d 1020, on page 224 the court
stated:
"The court has on numerous occasions been
concerned with the question whether one performing service for another was an employee, and therefore covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act,
or an independent contractor. What the relationship is depends upon the particular fact situation.
It is the prerogative and the responsibility of the
Commission to make this determination and it is so
well established as to hardly justify repetition that
its action will be sustained if there is any substantial credible evidence to support it so that it cannot
properly be classified as capricious or arbitrary."
The mere fact that Mr. Townsley, who is an employee
of Mountain States Drilling Company, demonstrated to the
plaintiff the work to be done, was not the type of control
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which would make the plaintiff an employee in lieu of an
independent contractor. There is no indication that Mr.
Townsley was a welder or knew anything about welding,
in order to exercise control as to the exact manner of performing the work, and there is indication (R. 51, 52) that
the plaintiff did have some activity as a professional
welder, and that the plaintiff alone was responsible for the
detail of welding. When there is any credible evidence to
sustain an Industrial Commission finding, it is this court's
duty to affirm the Commission. Sutton v. Industrial Commission, supra; 35-1-84, U. C. A. 1953.
In Burton v. Industrial Commission, 13 Utah 2d 353,
374 P. 2d 439, this court said at page 554:
"In order to reverse the finding and order made
Plaintiff must show that there is such credible uncontradicted evidence in her favor that the Commission's refusal to so find was capricious and arbitrary."
See also Morris v. Industrial Commission, 90 Utah 256, 61
P. 2d 415; Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial Commission, 99
Utah 423, 107 P. 2d 1027; 134 A. L. R. 1006.
The mere fact of showing the plaintiff what work was
needed was not exercising control so as to make the plaintiff an employee. Every independent contractor has to be
shown and given orders as to when and where certain work
will be done and then performs his skill without control.
Gogoff v. Industrial Commission, 77 Utah 355, 296 P. 229.
Furthermore, the evidence shows that the plaintiff
had all the equipment and supplies of a welder (R. 49, 50,
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51), and that the two alleged employers did not have such
equipment (R. 50), and that the plaintiff had been a professional welder in a separate occupation to that of either
alleged employer who were in the business of oil drilling.
Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110 U. 309, 172 P. 2d
136. The plaintiff was paid $2.00 an hour for his special
skill and for furnishing his own equipment, tools, supplies,
and transportation.
The distinction hereinabove made is set forth in the
Christean v. Industrial Commission case wherein the court
quotes from the Restatement of the Law of Agency, Par.
220, page 485 :
''* * * The important distinction is between service in which the actor's physical activities and his time are surrendered to the control of
the master, and service under an agreement to accomplish results or to use care and skill in accomplishing results. Those rendering service but retaining control over the manner of doing it are not
servants. They may be agents, agreeing only to
use care and skill to accomplish a result and subject
to the fiduciary duties of loyalty and obedience to
the wishes of the principal; or they may be persons
employed to accomplish or to use care to accomplish
physical results, without fiduciary obligations, as
where a contractor is paid to build a house. An
agent who is not subject to control as to the manner in which he performs the acts that constitute
the execution of his agency is in a similar relation
to the principal as to such conduct as one who
agrees only to accomplish mere physical results.

*

* *"
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(Quoted from 196 P. 2d, p. 513.)
We submit that in the case now before the court there
was substantial evidence to support the findings and Order
of the Commission, and that said findings and Order should
be affirmed.
POINT III.
THE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT SHOWN THAT
THE DEPOSITION OF RAY TOWNSLEY IS
INCORRECT OR EVEN THAT IT IS INJURIOUS TO THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY THE
PLAINTIFF AND THE DEPOSITION WAS
CORRECTLY ADMITTED BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.
It should be noted that notice was given to plaintiff

of the taking of a deposition of Mr. Ray Townsley and that
at this time the plaintiff was not represented by counsel.
The deposition was taken under Rules 26 and 30 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and there is no indication
other than the failure to give notice that this deposition
was contrary to the interests of the plaintiff. The Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, pursuant to 32 (d), as well as the
federal rule, require that a motion to suppress must be
made within a reasonable time of any deposition, etc., which
is irregularly filed, etc., or the party waives his right to
object, if any objection he has. Barron & Holtzoff, Federal
Practices and Procedures, Vol. 2A, Sec. 641-870; Oates V.
S. J. Groves & Sons Co., C. A. 6th 1957, 248 Fed. 388, 202
F. Supp. 181. The excuse given by the plaintiff was that
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he did not have sufficient funds to be present at the deposition, even though Rule 30(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure was not invoked by plaintiff, and yet plaintiff
requested that Mr. Ray Townsley be present to testify before the Commission without any showing of the manner
or method by which Mr. Townsley's presence would be obtained or paid for. There appears no definite point of proof
that the plaintiff is requesting from the deposition or testimony of Mr. Townsley nor is there any showing or controverted evidence of the deposition which plaintiff alleges is
harmful, except that no notice was given, and, therefore,
the deposition was rightfully admitted by the Industrial
Commission and the contents therein should and could be
used for any determination by the Industrial Commission.
Any right that the plaintiff may have had under Rules
30(b) and 32(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have
terminated, and the deposition of Mr. Townsley could be
used and certainly should be considered as evidence by the
Commission, and was rightfully admitted.
There does not seem to be any direct or positive injury to the plaintiff from the deposition of Ray Townsley,
and because of Section 35-1-88, U. C. A. 1953, supra, there
seems to be no need for notice to be given of filing of a
deposition before the Industrial Commission, because the
Act does not require it, and the Commission is not bound
by the Rules of Civil Procedure, because of Section 35-1-88,
U. C. A. 1953, heretofore mentioned.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the defendant's answer to
plaintiff's motion should be granted and the plaintiff's writ
of certiorari dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, or in the
alternative, the findings and the Order of the Industrial
Commission should be affirmed by this court.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Attorney 'General,
RONALD N. SPRATLING, JR.,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Defendant.
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